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EPIGENESIS OF PURE REASON 
AND THE SOURCE OF PURE COGNITIONS: 
How KANT IS No NATIVIST 
ABOUT LOGICAL COGNITION 
HUAPING LU-ADLER 
1. Introduction
Kant describes logic as "the science that exhaustively presents and 
strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking" (Bviii-ix). But 
what is the source of our cognition of such rules ("logical cognition" for 
short)? He makes no concerted effort to address this question. It will 
nonetheless become clear that the question is a philosophically significant 
one for him, to which he can see three possible answers: those 
representations are innate, derived from experience, or originally acquired 
a priori. Although he gives no explicit argument for the third answer, he 
seems committed to it - especially given his views on the source of pure 
concepts of the understanding and on the nature of logic. 
It takes careful preparatory work to gather all the essential materials 
for motivating and reconstructing Kant's "original acquisition" account of 
logical cognition. I shall proceed in two sections. 
In section 1, I analyze Kant's argument that pure concepts of the 
understanding (or intellectual concepts) - as one kind of pure cognition -
must be acquired originally and a priori. My analysis partly concerns his 
varied attitudes toward Crusius's and Leibniz's versions of the nativist 
account of such concepts. I give special attention to how Kant 
characterizes the nativist account and his own "original acquisition" 
account in terms of "preformation" and "epigenesis." My goal is, firstly, to 
tease out the sense in which Kant grants that there must be an innate 
ground ( or preformation) for the derivation of pure concepts and, 
secondly, to introduce - and pave the way for answering - the question 
about the source of logical cognition. 
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In section 2, in light of Kant's reference to Locke and Leibniz as the
greatest reformers of philosophy (including logic) in their times (Log, AA 9:
32), I examine the Lockean and Leibnizian approaches to logic, respectively.
Both approaches are "physiological" by Kant's standard and are directly
opposed to his own strictly critical method. I explain how this methodological
move shapes Kant's view that representations of logical rules must be
originally acquired a priori. This acquisition involves a kind of radical
epigenesis of pure reason: unlike the acquisition of pure concepts, it
presupposes no further innate ground (or preformation). This view will
have important consequences for issues such as the ground of the
normativity of logical rules and the boundaries of their rightful use.
2. Epigenesis, preformation, and the source of pure
concepts 
2.1. In his Inaugural Dissertation ("On the Form and Principles of the
Sensible and the Intelligible World," 1770), Kant inquires about the source
of "the concepts met with in metaphysics," including "possibility,
existence, necessity, substance, cause etc." He states: such concepts "are
not to be sought in the senses but in the very nature of the pure
understanding" and "not as innate concepts but as ... acquired concepts"
(MSI, AA 2: 395). He thereby points to a basic distinction among three
accounts of intellectual concepts as regards their source, which he will
revisit numerous times: these concepts are innate, derived from
experience, or acquired a priori. In general, he connects the first with
preformation, the second with physical influx, and the third with
epigenesis. He attributes these accounts to different philosophers, claiming
the last as his own. 
Crusius explains the real principle of reason [i.e., the principle of
contradiction or identity] on the basis of the systemate praeformationis
(from subjective principiis); Locke, on the basis of influxu physico like
Aristotele; Plato and Malebranche, from intuitu intellectuali; we, on the
basis of epigenesis from the use of the natural Jaws of reason. (Ref! 4275,
AA 17: 492; see Ref! 4859, AA 18: 12; Ref! 4893, AA 18: 21; Ref! 4894,
AA 18: 21-2) 
In Refl 4446, making a similar distinction, Kant inserts why Crusius's
theory of preformation - rooted in a "method of pre-established cognition"
- must be rejected: "because we do not know what God has given us" (AA
17: 554). Although Kant is evidently aware that there are different
versions of the nativist account, he seems to think that they fail for
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fundamentally the same reason, namely their inability to explain the 
objective validity of pure concepts of the understanding. He makes this 
point in his famous 1772 letter to Herz. 
Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source of the 
pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles. Mallebranche 
[sic] believed in a still-continuing perennial intuition of this primary being. 
... Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for the purpose of forming 
judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human soul 
just as they had to be in order to harmonize with things .... However, the 
deus ex machina is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the 
determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions .... it encourages 
all sorts of wild notions and every pious and speculative brainstorm. (Br, 
AA 10: 131) 
On Kant's reading, the deus ex machina in the nativist theories is intended 
but ultimately fails to answer the following question: on what grounds can 
pure concepts of the understanding be said to represent their purported 
objects or, which amounts to the same, to be objectively valid? (Br, AA 
10: 130-31). 
Kant brings up a similar question when he compares three accounts of 
categories in §27 of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction: what 
explains the necessary agreement between those concepts and experience? 
He first rejects the empiricist account, by comparing it to the biological 
theory of generatio aequivoca: just as an organic being cannot be generated 
mechanically from mere matter, so is it impossible for a priori concepts to 
come from experience. 1 Next, he submits his own account, on which 
categories arise through "as it were a system of the epigenesis of pure 
reason": they are "self-thought a priori first principles of our cognition," 
as what "contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general 
from the side of the understanding" Finally, he repudiates the nativist 
alternative, which amounts to "a kind of prefonnation-system of pure 
reason" and reduces categories to "subjective predispositions for thinking, 
implanted in us along with our existence by our author" The "decisive" 
reason against this account is that "in such a case the categories would 
lack the necessity that is essential to their concept" (B167-68). 2 Kant 
1 Kant characterizes generatio aequivoca elsewhere as the view that an organic 
being can be generated "through the mechanism of crude, unorganized matter" 
(KU, AA 5: 419 note). 
2 Many commentators have noted, and contributed to a rich conversation over the
implications of, Kant's analogy between the biological theories of origin and the 
philosophical accounts of the source of pure cognitions. To name a few: Wubnig 
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attributes this account to "Crusius alone" and repeats his old objection: 
"with the lack of sure criteria for distinguishing an authentic origin from a 
spurious one, ... one can never know for sure what the spirit of truth or the 
father of lies may have put into us" (Prol, AA 4: 319 note; see V­
Met/Schon, AA 28: 467-68). 
This reaction to the nativist account of pure concepts has two features 
that will lead to some interesting questions. First, during the 1780's, 
especially in Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-83) besides both editions of 
the Critique, Kant often presented Leibniz and Locke as the philosophers 
who somewhat replayed the Plato-Aristotle controversy over the source of 
intellectual concepts, i.e., over whether they are innate or acquired from 
experience (A854/B882; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 760-64). Why should Kant 
pick out Crusius, not Leibniz, as the representative of the nativist account 
at B167-68? The reason might be that Leibniz's version of nativism is so 
complex and contains so many valuable insights that it could hardly be 
rejected tout court. What would be those insights, though, so that Kant 
might not see them as sharply opposed to his own account of pure 
concepts? 
Second, at B 167-68 as well as in his earlier writings surveyed so far, 
Kant characterizes the nativist account and his own account of pure 
concepts in the biological terms of preformation and epigenesis, 
respectively, and rejects preformation in favor of epigenesis. However, he 
also makes the following statement in both editions of the Critique. 
[In the analytic of concepts we will] pursue the pure concepts into their 
first germs [Keime] and predispositions [Anlagen] in the human understanding, 
where they lie ready [vorbereitet liegen], until with the opportunity of 
experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the 
very same understanding[.] (A66/B91) 
The language of germs and predispositions is that of preformation. As 
Kant uses these notions to talk about organic life, "germs" are the 
"grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an 
organic body ... if this unfolding concerns particular parts," and the same 
grounds are called "natural predispositions" if the unfolding "concerns 
only the size or the relation of the parts to one another" (VvRM, AA 2: 
434). These germs and predispositions, he argues, must be posited as the 
preformed grounds that antecedently determine the specific development 
of an organic being in certain environments (VvRM, AA 2: 435-36; BM 
1969; Genova 1974; Zoller 1988; Ingensiep 1994; Sloan 2002; Zammito 2003; 
Mensch 2013. 
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AA 8: 96-9, 101-3). Mutatis mutandis, Kant's claim at A66/B91 seems to 
be that certain germs and predispositions in the human understanding must 
be assumed as the preformed grounds that determine the specific 
development and manifestation of pure concepts. Is this claim consistent 
with Kant's rejection of preformation at B 167-68? If the answer is 
positive, how shall we formulate Kant's epigenetic account of pure 
concepts so as not to exclude preformation in every sense of the term? 
We shall see that these questions about Kant's attitude toward 
Leibniz's nativism, on the one hand, and about the relation between 
A66/B91 and B167-68, on the other, are deeply connected. Sorting out the 
connection will give us a particularly helpful angle to appreciate the key 
points - together with a crucial methodological turn - that eventually set 
Kant's account of the source of pure concepts apart from all the nativist 
accounts attempted before him. 
2.2. According to John Callanan, it was after having read Leibniz's 
New Essays on Human Understanding that Kant showed - first in the 
Inaugural Dissertation - "a concern with the formation and acquisition of 
concepts" that was less pronounced in his previous writings. (Callanan 
2013: 12). The New Essays, as Ernst Cassirer puts it, opened up "an entire 
[sic.] new source" in Kant's inquiry about pure concepts, the new source 
being the mind, from which they could be drawn independently of 
experience. (Cassirer 1981: 98).3 If the New Essays was indeed a crucial 
source of inspiration in Kant's tl1inking about pure concepts, we have yet 
to clarify the exact nature and extent of this influence. 
Kant discusses Leibniz's account of the origin of pure concepts in 
different contexts. To appreciate the important ways in which Kant sees 
his own position on the said topic as both continuous with and different 
from Leibniz's, it will be particularly instructive to consider two sources. 
One source comprises some of Kant's lectures on metaphysics. The other 
is "On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be 
Made Superfluous by an Older One" (1790), where Kant responds to 
Johann August Eberhard's claim that whatever is of value in the Critique 
is already contained in the Leibnizian philosophy. 
In "On a Discovery," Kant clarifies his position on nativism while 
responding to Eberhard's remarks about his account of space and time as 
pure intuitions. According to Eberhard, Kant's account is either absurd or 
3 Kant probably did not read the New Essays until Louis Dutens's edition of 
Leibniz's Opera omnia appeared in 1768. For a further discussion of the likely 
impact of the direct access to Leibniz's New Essays on the development of Kant's 
theory of cognition, see Tonelli 1974. 
40 Epigenesis of Pure Reason and the Source of Pure Cognitions 
unoriginal - that is, he either treats space and time "as themselves original, 
not implanted in their grounds," in which case he "conceives a qualitas
occulta," or accepts that they are somehow implanted, which view is 
"wholly or partially contained in the Leibnizian theory" (UE, AA 8: 221). 
In reply, Kant presents an "original acquisition" account of those pure 
intuitions, an account that can be extended to pure cognitions in general.
4 
The Critique admits absolutely no implanted or inborn representations.
One and all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the 
understanding, it considers them as acquired. But there is also an original 
acquisition . . .  and thus of that which previously did not yet exist at all, and 
so did not belong to anything prior to this act. ... our cognitive faculty ... 
brings them [i.e. pure cognitions] about, a priori, out of itself. There must 
indeed be a ground for it in the subject, however, which makes it possible 
that these representations can arise in this and no other manner, and be 
related to objects which are not yet given, and this ground at least is innate.
CUE, AA 8: 221-22) 
The basic point of this passage is straightforward: a pure cognition, qua
representation, must be acquired, even though the ground of its acquisition 
is innate. 
This claim seems to raise more questions than it answers, though. 
What does it mean to say that the ground for acquiring pure cognitions 
must be innate? Why should Kant think that this innate ground "must" be 
posted in the subject? Moreover, with this admission of innate ground, 
how is Kant's account of the source of pure cognitions any different from 
Leibniz's nativist account? After all, Kant appreciates some features of 
Leibniz's nativism that supposedly make it superior to Plato's and 
Crusius's. If Plato posited innate ideas, Leibniz only "supposed certain 
innate predispositions of reason as existing in us." If Crusius thought "the 
criterion of truth [i.e. the agreement of our ideas with objects] is to be 
sought for only in the ideas which the creator has placed in us, just 
because he could not trust it to our reason that it would find these ideas 
itself," Leibniz left it to us - by exercising our innate rational capacities on 
occasion of experience - to find the ideas and discover their agreement 
with the objects. CV-Met/Vigil, AA 29: 959; see V-Met/Dohna, AA 28: 
665). On Kant's reading, then, the Leibnizian nativism is committed only 
to innate predispositions and capacities. Now recall his remark at 
4 Unless otherwise noted, I use 'cognition' as Kant defines it in the famous
Stufenleiter passage, where intuition and concept are presented as two kinds of 
cognition, which is a species of representation (A320/B376-77). 
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A66/B91 that pure concepts must be traced to their "first germs and 
predispositions in the human understanding." These germs and 
predispositions may very well be the innate ground he thinks must be 
presupposed for the development of pure concepts on occasion of 
experience. Thus, the admission of innate ground seems to make Kant a 
follower of the Leibnizian nativism after all. Does it really? 
Answering these questions is pivotal to a precise understanding of 
Kant's position. For that purpose, it will be helpful to begin with a quick 
look at how Leibniz presents his nativism in the New Essays. In a way, 
Leibniz is seeking a model of human mind that can explain why we can 
comprehend specific ideas or truths. By his analysis, such comprehension 
would be unintelligible on the Lockean model. To use the analogy of 
marble and its relation to a statue carved from it, "if the soul were like 
such a blank tablet [a la Locke] then truths would be in us as the shape of 
Hercules is in a piece of marble when the marble is entirely neutral as to 
whether it assumes this shape or some other" Instead, Leibniz argues, our 
mind must be like a naturally veined marble: 
if there were veins in the block which marked out the shape of Hercules 
rather than other shapes, then that block would be more determined to that 
shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labor 
would be required to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, ... 
This is how ideas and truths are innate in us - as inclinations, dispositions, 
tendencies, or natural potentialities, and not as actualities[.] (NE, Preface, 
52)5 
These remarks capture the essential difference between Leibniz's and 
Locke's conceptions of human mind. If the latter conception allows that 
our mind has native capacities for acquiring ideas and truths, 6 these 
capacities can only be "inactive faculties" or "pure powers," which 
Leibniz contends are "mere fictions, unknown to nature and obtainable 
only by abstraction" (NE, II.i.2, 110). The Leibnizian mind, by contrast, is 
"not a bare faculty, consisting in a mere possibility of understanding" 
5 Also: NE, I.i.11, 80; I.iii.20, 106; II.i.2, 110. References to Leibniz's New Essays
(NE) are to book, chapter, section, and pagination in Leibniz 1996. 
6 Locke grants that the human mind - though originally a tabula rasa "devoid of 
all characters, without any Ideas" (EHU, II.i.2, 104) - is endowed with the natural 
capacity to attain knowledge: "[God] hath furnished man with those faculties, 
which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of 
such a being" (EHU, I.iv.12, 91). References to Locke's An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding (EHU) are to book, chapter, section, and pagination in 
Locke 1975. 
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certain ideas or truths, but "a disposition, an aptitude, a preformation, 
which determines our soul and brings it about that they are derivable from 
it" (NE, Li.I 1, 80). 
This notion of human mind regarding its ability to derive ideas or 
truths from within itself reminds us of Kant's claim at A66/B91 that pure 
concepts "lie ready" in the human understanding - in the form of germs 
and predispositions, from which they can be "developed" into clear 
representations. Leibniz and Kant seem to share the view that, if concepts 
qua representations are not innate, the relevant predispositions - as the 
grounds of their derivation - must nevertheless be innate. Hence, Kant 
suggests that Leibniz's position in the New Essays, if properly interpreted, 
agrees with that of the Critique - so much so that the Critique "might well 
be the true apology for Leibniz, even against those of his disciples who 
heap praises upon him that do him no honor" (-OE, AA 8: 250). A non­
literal parsing of Leibniz's words, Kant proposes, is "more suited to his 
purpose; for otherwise his system will be inconsistent" In particular, 
Leibniz's claim about the "innateness of certain concepts" should be read 
as "an expression for a fundamental faculty with respect to a priori 
principles of our cognition, which he uses merely against Locke, who 
recognizes only an empirical origin" (UE, AA 8: 248-49). 
These remarks, turning Eberhard's originality objection on its head, 
may have "rhetorical flourish" to them. (Kant 2002: 21). Nonetheless, they 
also truthfully reflect how Kant positions himself in the Locke-Leibniz 
controversy over the origin of intellectual concepts. In this regard, as 
Cassirer puts it, how Leibniz's philosophy influenced Kant is "not a matter 
of what Leibniz was, but of how Kant understood and saw him" (Cassirer 
1981: 99). Kant's understanding of Leibniz's view is largely shaped by his 
attention to the polemic context in which it is presented. If "[i]n the quarrel 
between Leibniz and Locke, Kant had come down on the side of the 
former, and apparently without hesitation" (Cassirer 1981: 101), it is likely 
because he spotted valuable insights in Leibniz's account that dealt a 
decisive blow to Locke's empiricist account. 
There are at least two such insights. The first is that no necessary 
cognition can be derived from sensory experience. (I shall flesh out this 
point in 3.2, in connection with logical cognition.) The second is that an 
adequate account of the 01igin of pure concepts must posit certain active 
powers in the human mind.7 Kant's distinction between innate representations 
7 In one of his earlier essays, "Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative
Magnitudes into Philosophy" (1763), Kant already recognizes "something 
imposing and ... profoundly true" in Leibniz's thought that "the soul embraces the 
whole universe with its faculty of representation," the profound truth being that all 
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and innate capacities can be seen as a way to disambiguate, so to speak, 
the notion of innate concept and thereby clarify this second insight. In the 
Inaugural Dissertation he points out that, if some concepts are to be sought 
from within the mind, they are not in the mind as innate concepts qua 
representations, but are somehow "abstracted" from it "by attending to its 
actions on the occasion of an experience" (MSI, AA 2: 395). In 
Metaphysik Mrongovius, he suggests that in a sense intellectual concepts 
can be equated with certain mental activities: "The concepts of the 
understanding are nothing other than actions of reflection" (V-Met/Mron, 
AA 29: 762). In Metaphysik L1 (Politz), he conveys a similar point through 
the following remark about the "formative power" of our cognition. 
If this formative power is in the abstract (in abstracto), then it is the 
understanding. The conditions and actions of the formative power, taken in 
the abstract (in abstracto), are pure concepts of the understanding[.] (V­
Met-L/Politz, AA 28: 239) 
Likewise, a couple of times in the Critique, Kant describes pure concepts 
of the understanding "merely as actions [Handlungen] of pure thinking" 
(A57/B81; see BI05; also see Refl 4276, AA 17: 492; MAN, AA 4: 475). 
If pure concepts can therefore be seen as certain actions or active powers 
of the human mind, and if these active powers can be reasonably deemed 
innate, then Kant has enough conceptual room for a non-literal rendering 
of Leibniz's nativism: in treating certain concepts as innate, Leibniz really 
meant that they must exist in the mind as active powers. 
Still, Kant can only go so far in agreeing with Leibniz. In some places, 
we can see him shifting the gear and criticizing the philosophical method 
shared by Leibniz and Locke alike. A key notion in this criticism is 
"physiology." 
In the Critique, Kant uses the phrase "physiological derivation" to 
capture the Lockean attempt to draw pure concepts from experience. He 
contrasts such a derivation with a true "deduction" and rejects the former 
concepts must be grounded in "the inner activity [Thiitigkeit] of our minds" That 
is, an adequate explanation of the origin of all concepts must posit certain active 
powers in the human mind, for no concept can be produced through purely 
mechanical interactions with external objects. So Kant continues: "External things 
may well contain the condition under which concepts present themselves in one 
way or another; but external things do not have the power actually to produce those 
concepts. The power of thought possessed by the soul must contain the real 
grounds of all concepts, in so far as they are supposed to arise in a natural fashion 
within the soul" (NG, AA 2: 199). 
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as "idle". 
[A] deduction of the pure a priori concepts ... does not lie down this
[empiricist] path at all, for in regard to their future use, which should be
entirely independent of experience, an entirely different birth certificate
than that of an ancestry from experiences must be produced. I will
therefore call this attempted physiological derivation, which cannot
properly be called a deduction at all because it concerns a quaestio facti,
the explanation of the possession of a pure cognition. (A86-7/Bl 19)
Although Kant mostly gives Locke the title "physiologist of reason" (Refl 
4866, AA 18: 14; see V-Met/Vigil, AA 29: 958) or "physiologist of the 
understanding" (Refl 4893, AA 18: 21; see Aix; V-Lo/Hechsel, Pinder 1998: 
301), we shall see that he has a broad enough notion of "physiology" to 
apply the same labels to Leibniz. 
In Metaphysik Mrongovius, Kant distinguishes two questions about 
pure concepts. The first is a "question of fact (quaestio facti)": how have 
we come to possess those concepts? The second is a "question of right 
(quaestio iuris)": by what right can we avail ourselves of them? These 
questions correspond to two kinds of philosophical investigation, namely 
physiology - which is "really a part of psychology" - and critique of pure 
reason. Kant places Leibniz's as well as Locke's account of the origin of 
intellectual concepts in the former category. 
The former question has been the business of two philosophers, of Locke 
and Leibniz, the former wrote a book on human understanding <de
intellectu humano> and the latter published a book with this title in 
French. Locke adheres to Aristotle and maintains that concepts arose from 
experience through acts of reflection. Leibniz adheres to Plato, but not to 
his mysticism, and says that the concepts of the understanding are prior to 
acquaintance with any sensible objects. (V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 764) 
[Examining reason physiologically] was actually an explanation and 
investigation of the origin of concepts. Locke and Leibniz had not thought 
of a critique of concepts of reason; they investigated merely how we arrive 
at the concepts. . .. Leibniz did not ask how reason comes to a concept 
independently of all experience - upon what is the faculty grounded for 
cognizing something a priori at all? How far does it reach? . . . An 
investigation of practices (facti), how we arrive at cognition, whether from 
experience or through pure reason. (V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 781-82) 
These comments suggest that Kant has mixed opinions about the Locke­
Leibniz controversy. In one sense, Locke is in a worse place than Leibniz 
is when it comes to explaining the origin of pure concepts: Locke, by 
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ins1stmg that all concepts must be derived from experience, has an 
inconsistent position about pure concepts, 8 whereas Leibniz at least 
recognizes that some concepts must have a purely intellectual origin. In 
another sense, however, Leibniz's theory fares no better than Locke's: 
both have failed to explain "how it comes about that concepts of the 
understanding, which we have without the senses, have validity with 
respect to the objects of the senses" (V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 763). It is in 
connection to this issue of objective validity that Kant insists "critique," 
his own method, be "distinguished sharply from physiology" (V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 764).9 
Here we see, from Kant's perspective, the real divide between his 
quest for the source of pure concepts - via a critique of pure reason - and 
Leibniz's. By thus separating his own critical approach from Leibniz's 
physiological one, Kant has in effect answered yet another originality 
objection by Eberhard, namely that "the Leibnizian philosophy contains 
just as much of a critique of reason as the Kantian" For, if the Leibnizian 
philosophy (a la Eberhard) "grounds its dogmatism [i.e., its apodictic 
demonstrations of metaphysics] on a precise analysis of the cognitive 
faculties," such analysis is not a critique of pure reason in Kant's strict 
sense. (UE, AA 8: 226). 10 It is not that Leibniz's analysis of cognitive 
faculties has no value. It is just that, because it focuses on the de facto 
make-up of our mind and is in that sense a mere physiology of human 
intellect, it cannot answer the question of right or objective validity 
concerning pure concepts. 
With Kant thus distancing himself from Leibniz's philosophical 
method, one cannot help but wonder again about the nature of his afore­
mentioned attempt to uncover the true insights of Leibniz's nativist 
account of pure concepts. To what extent, if any, does Kant's "original 
acquisition" account of such concepts really agree with the perceived 
Leibnizian insights? In particular, as I queried earlier, does his admission 
that an innate ground - in the form of germs and predispositions - must be 
8 For this charge of inconsistency, see A95/B 127; A854-55/B882-83; V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 761; V-Met/Vigil, AA 29: 958-59. 
9 For a directly relevant discussion of Kant's complex relations with physiology, 
see Mensch 2013: 122-24. 
10 In Ref! 4851, Kant makes the following distinction between physiology and 
critique: "The study ... of the subject is either physiological or critical. Critique 
separates 1. the pure from the empirical faculty of cognition, 2. sensibility from the 
understanding." He then criticizes Leibniz for taking all a priori cognition to be 
intellectual and thereby failing to recognize the sensible in space and time. This 
criticism amounts to denying Leibniz of a true critique (AA 18: 8-9). 
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assumed for such acquisition really pull him into the camp of Leibnizian 
nativism (even on the non-literal reading sketched above)? 
2.3. Before answering these questions, it will be worthwhile to consider 
Kant's attitudes toward "preformation" and "epigenesis" as biological theories 
and to spell out some of the commitments that underlie those attitudes. 
The obvious place to start is §81 of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. There, having argued that to comprehend the possibility of 
organic beings we must assume a teleological principle of their generation,
Kant discusses various accounts of the causal ground of their "internally
purposive form". He starts by distinguishing "occasionalism" and
"prestabilism," only to dismiss the former as unphilosophical, according to 
which "the supreme world-cause, in accordance with its idea, would 
immediately provide the organic formation to the matter commingling in 
every impregnation" (KU, AA 5: 422). He then separates two kinds of 
prestabilism. One is the theory of "evolution" or "individual preformation," 
which "excepts every individual from the formative power of nature in 
order to allow it to come immediately from the hand of the creator" Kant 
rejects this theory for essentially the same reason as he has used against 
occasionalism: it is ultimately committed to "hyperphysics," even though 
unlike occasionalism it "would at least have left something to nature in
order not to fall into a complete hyperphysics, which could dispense with 
all natural explanation" (KU, AA 5: 423). Thus, to borrow Zammito's 
words, the theory of individual preformation and occasionalism alike 
signify "avoidance of science, a stipulative denial of the very possibility of 
a life science" (Zammito 2007: 53). 
Kant settles on the second kind of prestablism, namely the theory of 
"involution" or epigenesis. He makes two notable remarks about 
epigenesis. First, 
[epigenesis] can also be called the system of generic preformation, since 
the productive capacity [Vermogen] of the progenitor is still preformed in 
accordance with the internally purposive predispositions that were 
imparted to its stock, and thus the specific form was preformed virtualiter.
(KU, AA 5: 423) 
Second, regardless of whether there are enough "experiential grounds" to 
prove the epigenetic explanation of the possibility of organic beings, 
reason would still already be favorably disposed to this explanation
because it . . . with the least possible appeal to the supernatural, leaves
everything that follows from the first beginning to nature (without, 
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however, determining anything about this first beginning, on which
physics always founders, no matter what chain of causes it tries). (KU, AA
5: 424) 
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In other words, unlike the other theories, epigenesis "leaves natural
mechanism an indeterminable but at the same time also unmistakable role 
under this inscrutable principle of an original organization" (KU, AA 5: 
424). 
These remarks about epigenesis partly echo what Kant wrote about the 
generation of organic beings five years before, in his "Review of J.G. 
Herder's Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity" (1785). In 
the review, Kant comments on Herder's theory that a "genetic force" 
explains the climatic differences of human beings. He agrees with Herder 
that one must reject both "the system of evolution and . . . the mere 
mechanical influences of external causes as providing unworkable grounds
of elucidation" and that one must instead assume as the cause "a principle 
of life, which appropriately modifies itself internally in accordance with
differences of the external circumstances" (RezHerder, AA 8: 62). Then he
adds an important "reservation" about the assumed causal principle: 
if the cause organizing itselfji-om within were limited by its nature ... , then 
one could call this natural vocation [Naturbestimmung] of the forming 
nature also "germs" or "original predispositions," without thereby regarding
the former as primordially implanted machines and buds that unfold
themselves only when occasioned (as in the system of evolution), but
merely as limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty
[weiter nicht erkltirliche Einschrankungen eines sich selbst bildenden 
Vermogens], which latter we can just as little explain or make 
comprehensible. (RezHerder, AA 8: 62-3) 
According to Zammito, these comments - in conjunction with Kant's 
afore-cited claims about preformation and epigenesis in the third Critique 
- signal two steps that Kant had to take in adapting Herder's notion of
epigenesis to his own methodological and philosophical commitments.
First, Kant had to insist that even epigenesis implied preformation: at the 
origin there had to be some 'inscrutable' (transcendent) endowment, and 
with it, in his view, some determinate restriction in species variation. 
Thereafter, the organized principles within the natural world would 
proceed on adaptive (mechanical) lines. . . . Even so, this seemed to 
postulate the objective actuality of these forces for natural science. That 
violated Kant's 'Newtonianism'. Hence Kant faced the ultimate need for a 
second step: to transpose the whole matter from the constitutive to the 
regulative order. (Zammito 2007: 59-60) 
48 Epigenesis of Pure Reason and the Source of Pure Cognitions 
The second step, as Zammito portrays it, is characteristically Kantian: the 
postulation of an original endowment in an organic being - in the form of 
"germs" and "predispositions" - is not a scientific or metaphysical 
speculation about what are actually there at the beginning. Rather, the 
postulation is at bottom a regulative principle that reason needs in order to 
comprehend the possibility of the specific developments of organic beings 
in accordance with natural laws and in response to various external 
circumstances. 
In 2.4, we shall be able trace out a similar two-step move in how Kant 
goes from recognizing the insights of Leibniz's nativism to rejecting its 
methodology. In the process, we can also appreciate what is distinctively 
Kantian about Kant's view that there must be some innate ground - in the 
form of germs and predispositions - for the original acquisition of pure 
concepts. 
2.4. Kant's search for an adequate account of the source of pure 
concepts is a principled one, as it more or less follows the thread of two 
constraints. The first is a methodological constraint: the sought account 
must be truly explanatory and philosophical - i.e., firmly based on a 
rational inquiry that, as Kant put it in the letter to Herz, admits no "wild 
notions" or "pious and speculative brainstorm" (Br, AA 10: 131). The 
second constraint concerns the nature of pure concepts: the account must 
retain the strict necessity of pure concepts, suffice to establish their 
objective validity, and thereby determine the precise boundaries of their 
rightful use. In terms of these constraints, we can recast Kant's views 
about the alternative accounts of pure concepts and get a clearer sense of 
how his "original acquisition" account departs from all of them, especially 
from Leibniz's. 
To begin, tracing the source of pure concepts to implanted 
representations violates the first constraint. The hypothesis of implanted 
representations would be "very unphilosophical," reducing the quest for 
the source of pure concepts to a matter of divine "revelation," as opposed 
to genuine "investigation" CV-Met-Li/Politz, AA 28, AA 233; see V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 760-63; V-MetNigil, AA 29: 949-52). On the other
hand, the empiricist account does qualify as a philosophical attempt at
addressing the problem of such concepts - insofar as it seeks to explain
their origin in terms of natural causation (viz., physical influx). Still, it
fails to satisfy the second constraint: no strict necessity can be established
through empirical derivation (more on this point in 3.2). 
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Nor, it is important to add, would Kant find it enough to supplement 
the empiricist account with a hypothesis that the human mind has a sheer
capacity - naturally endowed but completely indeterminate - to obtain 
pure concepts on occasion of experience. He would regard such a 
hypothesis in the same fashion as he treats the notion of vis plastica that 
was sometimes invoked to explain the formation and propagation of 
organic beings. In the latter case, the purported explanation is tautological 
or "explanation idem per idem," telling us nothing as to why organic 
beings propagate in specific ways CV-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 81-2; see 
Kant 1997: 558-59n.19). If one is to explain the possibility of specific 
developments of an organic being by positing a naturally endowed 
formative power, the hypothesis has explanatory value only if it also says 
something about the antecedent conditions that determine the function of 
that power. As Kant puts it in the third Critique, 
[for every organized being, I must] think in its form and in its construction 
a necessity for being formed in a certain way, namely in accordance with a 
concept that precedes the formative causes of this organ, without which the 
possibility of this product of nature is not comprehensible for me in 
accordance with any mechanical natural law[.] (KU, AA 5: 240) 
Hence, if an organic being must have a "self-propagating formative 
power" (KU, AA 5: 374), this power will be more like a "formative drive" 
(Bildungstrieb) that operates, "as it were, under the guidance and 
direction" of the "inscrutable principle of original organization" (KU, AA 
5: 424). Analogously, the mere hypothesis that the human mind has the 
natural capacity to acquire pure concepts does not yet explain how we can 
acquire a specific set of such concepts - e.g., cause, substance, unity, etc. 
For the requisite explanation, one would have to say more about the 
antecedent conditions that determine the capacity. Leibniz said it: if we 
have the mental capacity to acquire intellectual concepts, there must be a 
certain predisposition that "determines the soul" so that a specific 
intellectual concept can be derived from it - just as the veins of a piece of 
marble determine it to one form of statue rather than another (NE, I.i.11, 
80). 
This claim by Leibniz can serve as a starting point for Kant, from 
which he needs to take two steps - in view of the afore-mentioned two 
constraints on a satisfactory account of the source of pure concepts - to 
arrive at the "original acquisition" account. The first step is manifested in 
how, as we saw in 2.2, Kant would extract true insights from Leibniz's 
nativist account. One perceived insight was that pure concepts must be 
traced to an active mental faculty with inherent predispositions, which are 
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the basis for their derivation from the mind. If Leibniz would therefore
view pure concepts as innate, Kant cautioned against a literal reading of
the view, according to which these concepts are in us as implanted
representations. For Leibniz's account would then become "a philosophy
of the lazy," violating the condition of a genuine inquiry about the source
of pure concepts (MSI, AA 2: 406). Instead, the essence of Leibniz's view
is that certain active powers or capacities must be posited in the mind as
the innate ground from which specific concepts can be developed.
This non-literal rendering of Leibniz's view can be seen as a step that
brings Kant to his claim at A66/B91 that pure concepts must be traced to
their "first germs and predispositions in the human understanding," which
are not representations, but certain active powers to be developed into
specific representations on occasion of experience. 11 Here, Kant would
add the same kind of caveat as he did while commenting on Herder's
notion of genetic force. In the latter case, if the Naturbestimmung of the
self-forming capacity of an organic being can be called "germs" and
"predispositions," these should not be seen as primordially implanted buds
or machines. Likewise, if the Naturbestimmung that determines the
derivation of pure concepts can be considered in terms of germs and
predispositions, these should not be treated as implanted mental
representations - for otherwise there would be no genuine acquisition of
the concepts.12 
11 For Kant, eve1y concept is "made" with respect to its form as a "universal
representation, or a representation of what is common to several objects" (Log, AA
9: 91, 93; see V-Lo/Politz, AA 24: 567-8; V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 904, 908; V­
Lo/Bauch, Pinder 1998: 151-52). More specifically, through certain "logical actus
of the understanding," representations that are "given to it from elsewhere" may be
"transform[ed] ... into concepts" (A76/B102; see V-Lo/Politz, AA 24: 566; V­
Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 907). Such acts, including reflection and abstraction among
others, constitute "the essential and universal conditions for generation of every
concept whatsoever" (Log, AA 9: 94; see V-Lo/Hechsel, Pinder 1998: 393-95; V­
Lo/Warschauer, Pinder 1998: 609-10). Pure concepts, however, arise from the
understanding not merely as to form, but "even as to content" (Log, AA 9: 92). It
is presumably the need to account for their specific content that Kant finds it
necessary to trace them to their first germs and predispositions.
12 In parts of the New Essays, though, Leibniz seems to suggest the "implanted
buds (representations)" view. For instance, while clarifying that certain ideas and
truths are innate in us as predispositions, Leibniz says: the claim of innate truths
does not entail that there are innate thoughts - for "thoughts are actions, whereas
items of knowledge (or truths), insofar as they are within us even when we do not
think of them, are tendencies or dispositions" (NE, I.i.24, 86). The wording
suggests that the Leibnizian mind comes equipped with some determinate
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The distinction between what is "implanted" (anerschaffen) and what 
is "innate" (angeborn, connatus) is a substantive one for Kant. If one way 
to be innate is to be implanted, what is innate need not be implanted. 
These notions carry significantly different implications: the use of 
"implanted," but not "innate," presupposes a prior proof of God's 
existence (UE, AA 8: 222). In these terms, can Kant find a way to show 
that the original germs and predispositions assumed as the ground for the 
derivation of pure concepts are innate but not implanted, and hence 
presuppose no divine involvement? 
The gravity of this question has to do with Kant's second constraint on 
a satisfactory account of the source of pure concepts: it must establish the 
objective validity of those concepts. Granting that the ground for the 
original acquisition of pure concepts is innate, Kant sometimes takes this 
innate ground to consist in "the laws inherent in the mind" from which the 
concepts may be derived (MSI, AA 2: 395). If these laws must in turn 
depend on the divine existence, however, the said constraint would not be 
satisfied. For, along the same line as Kant's earlier objection to Crusius's 
view, the agreement of these concepts with their objects would then be 
contingent on the de facto constitution of our mind, about which we would 
never be apodictically certain (insofar as it relies on a creator whose 
actions we cannot know). This concern about the objective validity of pure 
concepts might be what underlies Kant's complaint that Leibniz "did not 
ask how reason comes to a concept independently of all experience - upon 
what is the faculty grounded for cognizing something a priori at all?" (V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 781). More precisely, if Leibniz did examine the 
ground on which to obtain cognitions a priori, the purported ground could 
only be the metaphysical constitution of our mind, which would be 
contingent on God and so would not be a genuine ground by Kant's 
standard. 
Therefore, Kant must take a further step away from Leibniz's account, 
namely from a physiological to a transcendental derivation of pure 
concepts. He indicated this step while criticizing Leibniz's as well as 
Locke's physiological method. As I explained in 2.2, by Kant's analysis 
Leibniz and Locke asked only a quaestio facti about pure concepts, 
namely how tl1ey actually come into our mind. Accordingly, in their quest 
for the origin of those concepts, they both turned to the natural constitution 
representations ("items of knowledge" or "truths"). These representations are 
dispositional only because we stand in such an epistemic relation to them that we 
are not actively thinking of them: "we know many things which we scarcely think 
about" (NE, I.i.24, 86; see I.i.5, 77). On how Leibnizian innate dispositions are 
reducible to inborn representations, see Jolley 1988: 85-7. 
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of the human mind (as God's creation). Kant, by contrast, focuses on the 
quaestio juris in his quest. The result is a transcendental derivation of pure 
concepts - through, as it were, the epigenesis of pure reason, whereby they 
are acquired originally and a priori as what constitute the intellectual 
ground of the possibility of experience in general. Only this act of original 
acquisition can supposedly secure the objective validity of those 
concepts. 13 
This transcendental derivation might be what Kant meant by the claim 
at A66/B91 that pure concepts are "pursue[d] ... into their first germs and 
predispositions in the human understanding" These germs and predispositions 
are, presumably, the "universal logical functions of thinking" (Bl59) 
specified in the Table of Judgments at A70/B95. If these "logical 
functions" comprise the innate ground that must be assumed for the 
original acquisition of pure concepts, Kant would add that this notion of 
innate ground is not a metaphysical speculation about the actual 
constitution of the human mind. Hence, instead of referring to what is 
literally inherent in the mind (as he occasionally did in the 1770's, e.g., in 
the Inaugural Dissertation), he now talks about the transcendental 
conditions that determine the function or action of the understanding, 
namely thinking. 
This last point will prove vital to our understanding of Kantian logic, 
through which the "universal logical functions of thinking" are to be 
cognized. Jennifer Mensch, after explaining how 'Kant could understand 
the epigenesis of concepts from the use of the natural laws of reason,' 
wonders about the status of these laws: 'Were they in fact as preformed as 
the supernaturally preformed germs generically maintaining the species 
lines?' (Mensch 2013: 10). If this is a question about the origin of the laws 
of reason, it might make sense to pose it to the Kant of 1770's, when he 
was indeed concerned about issues of origin. However, having turned from 
physiology to critique, the Kant of 1780' s would deem it irrelevant to ask 
whether the laws that somehow ground pure concepts - if those laws can 
indeed be called "innate" - have a supernatural origin. Nor would it be 
appropriate to call them "natural laws," if by this expression is meant the 
laws that govern the actual operations of the human mind, which would 
not have the right kind of necessity to serve as the ground of pure 
concepts. The grounding laws of these concepts, then, can only be innate 
in a very limited sense: it is not that they are constitutive of the mind as a 
contingently existent metaphysical entity, but that they are essential to the 
13 For a further discussion of the connection between original acquisition and the 
objective validity of pure concepts, see Callanan 2013 ( especially pp.16-7). 
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human understanding qua faculty of thinking. Because these grounding
laws are not assumed as supernaturally sourced preformation, here pure
reason would not stop at any inscrutable first principle (as it would have in
the case of life science). It must know exactly what those laws are before
deriving specific pure concepts from them. The question is how it will
obtain such knowledge. 
3. Radical epigenesis and the cognition of logical
rules a priori 
3.1. Based on 2.1-2.4, we can gather three basic claims in a Kantian
account of the source of pure cognitions in general. First, they cannot be
derived from experience. Second, they should not be treated as
representations 01iginally imprinted on the human mind. Third, the human
understanding or reason - as the only possible source of these cognitions -
must be regarded as an active faculty, namely a faculty of spontaneity or
"the faculty for bringing forth representations itself' (A51/B75). This
spontaneity is key to the possibility of original acquisition: reason can
bring forth new representations out of itself entirely a priori. Though this
capacity must be awakened by experience, the cognitions emerging
through it are not therefore drawn from experience CV-Met-Li/Politz, AA28: 233; V-Met/Mron, AA 29: 761; V-MeUVigil, AA 29: 951). In the case
of pure concepts, as I pointed out in 2.4, such claims were intended to
meet two conditions of an adequate account of their source, i.e., to satisfy
the methodological constraint of a genuine inquiry and to account for the
objective validity of those concepts.
To the extent that Kant treats the cognition of logical rules as a kind of
pure cognition, we can expect him to make similar claims about the source
of logical cognition in light of similar constraints. In this case, the first
constraint has to do with Kant's notion of logic as a proper "science" The
second constraint concerns the characteristics of logical rules as the formal
rules of all thinking: they are strictly necessary, universal, and normative.
More specifically, Kant presents logic in general as "the science of the
rules of understanding in general" (A52/B76). The essential function or
action of the understanding is thinking, which is necessarily governed by
rules. Thinking may be treated in different ways, either in abstracto or in
concreto - that is, either independently of or with reference to the
empirical subjective conditions under which it actually takes place.
Accordingly, there are two sorts of rules for thinking: necessary rules,
which concern the essence of thinking and represent the conditions for the
possibility of thinking as regards its mere form, without regard to any
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empirical considerations, and contingent rules, which describe how the 
faculties of thinking tend to be used under certain empirical-psychological 
conditions of the subject CV-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 790-92; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 
24: 693; Log, AA 9: 12-3; Refl 1603, AA 16: 33; Refl 1620, AA 16: 40; 
Refl 1628, AA 16: 44). In reference to this distinction, Kant divides 
general logic into two parts, namely pure and applied logics. Pure logic is 
"the part that is to constitute the pure doctrine of reason," which "has no 
empirical principles" and thus "draws nothing from psychology," whereas 
applied logic is "directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under 
the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us" (A53-
4/B77-8). 
In Kant's view, only pure logic is "properly science": it is "a proven 
doctrine, and everything in it must be completely a priori" (A54/B78). It 
follows that only pure logic is tmly logic, which, insofar as it is a science, 
"rests on principles a priori, from which all its rules can be derived and 
proved" In other words, a strict logic must be "a doctrine or a 
demonstrated theory" - namely "a dogmatic instmction from principles a 
priori, in which one has insight into everything through the understanding 
without instruction from other quarters attained from experience" (Log, 
AA 9: 14-5; see V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 793; V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 13, 
25; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 694; V-Lo/Politz, AA 24: 505-6). 14 
Parallel to the distinction between pure and applied logics is one 
between logica artificialis and logica naturalis. Again, Kant argues that 
only artificial logic can be scientific and hence be properly called "logic" 
His argument hinges on the systematic character of science: a science 
"requires a systematic cognition, hence one composed in accordance with 
rules on which we have reflected" (Log, AA 9: 139). More specifically, 
[by] science [Wissenschaft] ... is to be understood the complex of a cognition 
as a system. It is opposed to common cognition, i.e., to the complex of a 
cognition as mere aggregate. A system rests on an idea of the whole, 
which precedes the parts, while with common cognition on the other hand, 
or a mere aggregate of cognitions, the parts precede the whole. (Log, AA 
9: 72; see V-Lo/Hechsel, AA 24: 114; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 697-98, 704, 
14 The term 'dogmatic' has a special sense in this context. "Dogmatic cognition,"
as cognition of reason from concepts a priori, differs both from "historical" 
cognition, which is a posteriori and lacks apodictic certainty, and from 
"mathematical" cognition, which is cognition of reason from construction of 
concepts. (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 99; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 697, 724; V­
Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 797-98, 830-31; Log, AA 9: 22, 71; Bxxxv). Thus, saying 
"science must always be dogmatic" is the same as saying "it must prove its 
conclusions strictly a priori from secure principles [Principien]" (Bxxxv). 
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717; V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 891) 
Thus, to have a scientific cognition of x, one must not only be conscious of
x but also have reflected on the ground from which it can be demonstrated.
To that extent, "all science is artificial" (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 694). If
logic is to be a truly scientific cognition of the rules of thinking, then, it
can only be logica artificialis, not logica naturalis.
Every man observes the rules before he can reduce them to formulas ....
The complex of all these rules is called logica naturalis. The science that
expounds these rules systematically [is called logica] artificialis . ... This
division [of natural and artificial logics] is bad because logic is held to be
the complex of rules of the understanding that we employ without being
conscious. Since we do not know these rules, however, there cannot be a
science. Consequently this is a contradiction . ... For us, then, only logica
artificialis is ever called logic. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 791; see Ref! 1579,
AA 16: 18) 
To say that "[o]nly; artificial or scientific logic deserves this name ['science']"
is to say that the rules of thinking included therein "can and must be
cognized a priori, independently of the natural use of the understanding
and of reason in concreto" (Log, AA 9: 17). Such rules concern how we
ought to think, not how we do think (Log, AA 9: 14; Refl 1579, AA 16:
18, AA 20-1; Refl 1599, AA 16: 30; Refl 3939, AA 17: 356; V-Lo/Politz,
AA 24: 502; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 694). They are necessary in the
absolute sense, constituting "the sole [formal] condition of our thought"
CV-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 791) - so that without them "no use of the
understanding [which consists in thinking] would be possible at all" (Log,
AA 9: 12; see V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 694; V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 790; V­
Lo/Hechsel, Pinder 1998: 273). It follows that the rules are also strictly
universal, applying to all possible thoughts - and for that reason must be
cognized a priori. 15 
The question is: how can we cognize certain rules as the necessary
rules of tl1inking in general, if not by drawing them from experience? This
question, to borrow Jasche's terms, amounts to asking "how ... pure logic
is possible as a science," in much the same way as asking how pure
mathematics is possible as a science (Log, AA 9: 8). It ultimately concerns
the ground for representing logical rules as what ought to be followed in
15 A rule with "true or strict" universality is one to which there can be no exception.
Thus, it cannot be derived from experience through induction but must be proven
"valid absolutely a priori," i.e., derived from a priori principles (B3-4).
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all possible use of the understanding and of reason - a representation that
must be accompanied by a clear consciousness of those rules and, even
more, by a consciousness of their necessity. (We shall appreciate the
significance of these qualifications when we compare Kant's view with
Leibniz's.) 
3.2. If the controversy between Locke and Leibniz over the source of
pure concepts came down to different views of the human mind apropos
its original state, the same difference underlies their disagreement with
respect to logical rules or principles. Spelling out the basics of this
disagreement will give us an opportunity to see both the continuity and the
originality of Kant's account of the source of logical cognition in relation
to Locke's and Leibniz's accounts, respectively. 
On Locke's account, to explain how we can attain knowledge and
make correct inferences, both of which consist in perceptions of the
agreement or disagreement among our ideas, there is no need to posit
innate logical principles. Rather, God has endowed us with appropriate
"natural abilities" for achieving those cognitive ends (EHU, I.iv.12, 91). In
particular, if common people can make cogent inferences without ever
being taught formal inference rules such as syllogisms, it is because God
has given all humans a mind with "a native faculty to perceive the
coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right" without
relying on any innate knowledge of those rules (EHU, IV.xvii.4, 671).
Leibniz counters that in a way everyone does know logical rules, such
as the principles of contradiction and identity - just that "we use these
maxims without having them explicitly in mind," i.e. without thinking of
them (NE, I.i.4; 76). 
For general principles enter into our thoughts, serving as their inner core
and as their mortar. Even if we give no thought to them, they are necessary
for thought, as muscles and tendons are for walking. The mind relies on
these principles constantly; but it does not find it so easy to sort them out
and to command a distinct view of each of them separately, ... And it is in
that way that many things are possessed without the possessor's knowing
it. (NE, I.i.20; 84) 
The necessity of the principles in question is central to Leibniz's
argument: the fountain of necessary principles can only be the mind as
opposed to the senses. For "the senses are inadequate to show their
necessity": "however often one experienced instances of a universal truth,
one could never know inductively that it would always hold unless one
knew through reason that it was necessary". Therefore, the mind alone is
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the "source" of such truths, including logical principles, with "a disposition ... 
to draw them from its own depth" To think otherwise is to fail to "think 
through the implications of the distinction between necessary or eternal truths 
and truths of experience" (NE, I.i.5, 80; see NE, Preface, 49-51). 
Kant would certainly agree with Leibniz that no necessary principles 
could be derived from sensory experience. Nonetheless, he might find 
Leibniz's account of the source of our knowledge of logical principles 
inadequate for two reasons. 
First, Leibniz's account is far from meeting the criterion of a true 
science of logic. Recall Kant's distinction between logica naturalis and 
logica artificialis. For Leibniz, if logical rules are constitutive of the 
inherent structure of the human mind and determine all possible use of the 
human intellect, they are the kind of rules that we often employ naturally, 
without being conscious of them. 
There are principles of knowledge which enter into our reasonings as 
constantly as practical ones enter into our volitions; for instance, everyone 
makes use of the rules of inference through a natural logic, without being 
aware of them. (NE, I.ii.3, 91) 
Leibniz sometimes contrasts natural logic with "logic as an art". This 
contrast captures the difference between "the common run of men," who 
can reason well in ordinary circumstances without consciously thinking of 
the formal rules on which the cogency of their reasoning depends, and 
those who are "practised" in logic and can therefore prove their reasonings 
as correct (NE, IV.xvii.4, 482). The rules of reasoning involved are the 
same, however, no matter whether one uses them naturally or as an art.16 
[The laws of logic J are nothing but the laws of good sense, set into order in 
writing, ... The only difference is that their being put in writing and made 
easier to take in all at once enables one to see them more clearly with a 
view to developing and applying them. For when natural good sense 
undertakes to analyse a piece of reasoning without help from the art [of 
logic], it will sometimes be in a little difficulty about the validity of the 
inferences[.] (NE, IV.xvii.4, 480-81; see Leibniz 1956: 759, 764-5) 
Articulating logical rules then amounts to uncovering the natural and 
constant laws of the human mind and representing them distinctly, by 
16 See NE, xlviii for the translators' note on the term 'art': when Leibniz
distinguishes the use of logic as an art and its natural use, he is referring to a 
contrast "between what is technical and [consciously] rule-governed on the one 
hand and what is natural or intuitive or unschooled on the other." 
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reducing them "to the bare bones of 'logical form
"' (NE, IV.xvii.4, 480).
Thus, even what is an artful logic on Leibniz's account would not qualify
as a strictly scientific logic in Kant's sense. For its grounding principles
are not a priori. 17 
The second reason why Kant might find Leibniz's account inadequate
concerns the normativity of logical rules, as rules that determine how we
ought to use our understanding. 
18 If such rules are supposed to be
absolutely binding, to the extent that no thinking would be possible
without them, what justifies this claim of bindingness? It would not do to
say that our mind is just so constituted that it, when functioning properly,
operates exactly in accordance with those rules (no matter whether we are
aware of them). In this respect, Leibniz would fair no better than Locke. In
Kant's terms, Locke approaches logic through an empirical-psychological
analysis of the human understanding, which can teach us only how it
operates under the contingent conditions of the empirically situated
thinking subject.19
 Any rule of thinking derived on that basis at best has
what Kant calls "assumed and comparative universality," which is not
enough to make it a norm for all possible use of the understanding. For
experience shows only that "something is constituted thus and so, but not
that it could not be otherwise," or that there has been no exception to this
or that rule, but not that "no exception at all is allowed to be possible"
(B3-4). 
Leibniz, on the other hand, saves logic from empirical-psychological
contingencies only to make it contingent on what Remnant and Bennett
call a "divine psychology" (NE, xviii). In Leibniz's own words, the
"ultimate foundation" of all eternal truths, including all putative logical
principles, must be "that Supreme and Universal Mind who cannot fail to
exist and whose understanding is indeed the domain of eternal truths"
Insofar as the said truths "contain the determining reason and regulating
principle of existent things - the laws of the universe" and must be "prior
to the existence of contingent beings," including our minds, they must
originally reside with God, the only necessary existence. Logical rules are
17 This feature is even more pronounced in Wolffs treatment of artificial logic.
The content of this logic, Wolff argues, must be demonstrated from principles that
only ontology and (empirical) psychology can supply. See Wolff, Preliminary
Discourse, ##89-90, 117, 135, 139, 144, 154, 156; Empirical Psychology,
Prolegomena, #9; Latin Logic, Prolegomena, §2.
18 The normative reading of Kant's theory of logic has come under attack in Tolley
2006. I answer Tolley's challenges in Lu-Adler (forthcoming).
19 For discussions of Locke's facultative logic and its impact, see Buickerood
1985; Winkler 2003. 
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the laws of the universe that regulate the operations of human intellect. As 
such, they must exist prototypically in the divine intelligence, as the 
"pattern" after which they are "engraved in our souls" - albeit "not in the 
form of propositions, but rather as sources which, by being employed in 
particular circumstances, will give rise to actual assertions" (NE, IV.xi.14, 
447). Whether Leibniz intends these remarks to be taken literally or non­
literally, it is clear that on his account God is the ultimate source of the 
purported normative force of logical rules. God, to borrow an expression 
from Descartes, is the "supreme legislator" of these rules (Descartes 1985: 
294) - with the caveat that for Leibniz they depend on God's intellect, not
on His will. To that extent, if logical rules are necessary for all possible
uses of the human intellect, even their necessity is contingent. 20 
As for how Kant would account for the source of logical rules in a way 
that would establish their absolute necessity and authority, the key again 
lies in a methodological move from physiology to true critique. This time, 
though, he seems to use Locke as a starting point. 
Kant remarks that Locke's Essay, or "book de intellectu humano," has 
treated "the ground of all true logica" CV-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 37). 
Notably, this remark occurs in the context where Kant compares dogmatic 
and critical methods of philosophizing and singles out Locke as the 
representative of the latter method. Here, critical method is taken in a 
broad sense, which "consists in investigating the procedure of reason 
itself, in analyzing the whole human faculty of cognition" (Log, AA 9: 
32). In these terms, Locke's perceived insight is that logic must be 
grounded in an analysis of the human understanding or reason. However, 
Kant rejects Locke's physiological version of the critical method, which 
centers on the de facto workings of the human understanding under 
empirical conditions. In its place, Kant proposes a true critique of the 
human understanding as a pure faculty of thinking, in abstraction from all 
empirical conditions under which it may take place (Refl 4851, AA 18: 8-
9; Refl 4866, AA 16: 14; Refl 4893, AA 18: 21).21 
20 Wolff holds the same view: natural logic, on which artificial logic depends for
legitimacy, comprises none other than the "rules prescribed by God to the 
understanding, and the natural aptitude to act accordingly" (German Logic, 
XVI.iii). 
21 In Ref! 4851, Kant begins with the broad notion of critical method, which 
concerns "either how we attain principles and concepts, or: what they contain and 
how they are possible" The clause "physiology: Locke" is added later, which 
corresponds to the first kind of "critical" method. (AA 18: 9; see V-Lo/Philippi, 
AA 24: 338). 
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In the end, by the strict Kantian standard of critical method, Locke's 
approach is only a dogmatic one. Kant says: 
[Locke] sought to analyze the human understanding and to show which 
powers of the soul and which of its operations belonged to this or that 
cognition. But he did not complete the work of his investigation, and also 
his procedure is very dogmatic, although we did gain from him, in that we 
began to study the nature of the soul better and more thoroughly. (Log, AA 
9: 32) 
The dogmatic aspect of Locke's approach shows itself in his insistence on 
basing all cognitions on experience, which ties him to an empirical­
psychological or physiological investigation of the soul. If Kant finds this 
Lockean investigation incomplete and intends to continue its practice of 
founding any purported science or system of cognition on an analysis of 
the human understanding, he will be steering it in a different direction. 
While other philosophers may have followed Locke and "begun to study 
the human soul" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 804),22 Kant will focus not so 
much on the human soul as on the faculty of human understanding 
considered in abstracto - especially if he is to pinpoint the source of 
logical cognition. 
For Kant, then, tracing out the source in question is not a matter of 
figuring out the actual constitution of the human soul, a constitution that 
would - as it did in both Locke's and Leibniz's philosophy - finally 
depend on God. It rather comes down to a transcendental derivation of 
logical rules as the a priori conditions for the possibility of all thinking -
similar to the derivation of pure concepts as the a priori intellectual 
conditions for all possible experience.23 
As for how the transcendental derivation of logical rules would 
proceed, we may gather some hints from Kant's logic corpus - mainly 
22 For a relevant discussion, see Fischer 1975. 
23 Kant uses 'transcendental' to modify a whole range of things. Besides familiar 
notions such "transcendental deduction" and "transcendental idealism," he also 
talks about transcendental cognition (Al 1-12), transcendental use of the pure 
concepts (A246/B303), transcendental object (A288-89/B344-45), transcendental 
philosophy (Al3-14/B27-8, A477-78/B505-6), transcendental constitution of the 
cognitive subject (A97-8), transcendental proofs (A782-94/B810-22), and so on 
and so forth. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether these uses 
can be traced to a single meaning of 'transcendental', which may then be adapted 
for my purpose. If anything, of all the claims Kant makes about the transcendental, 
what is most relevant to my interpretation is his contrast of transcendental and 
empirical deductions at A85/B 117. 
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from his remarks about the nature of logic and logical rules.
To begin, recall that Kant views logical rules as universal (they arerules of thinking in general), necessary (all possible thinking must accordwith them), and a priori (they must be cognized independently of
experience). These features are closely related: "if logic is to be a science
of the universal laws of the understanding, then these must be necessary
rules"; and "necessary rules must be derived a priori," as no amount of
experience can prove the necessity of any rule (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 792-
3). Now, the apriority of logic in turn suggests that it "will thus have no
other grounds or sources than the nature of human understanding" (V­
Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 25). In short, the strict universality of a rule "points
to a special source of cognition for it, namely a faculty of a priori
cognition" (B4). 
The faculty for cognizing logical rules a priori is the pure understanding
or reason. On Kant's account, logic is a rational science both because it
"has reason as its object" and because it "is drawn from reason" alone (V­
Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 792; see V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 697; V-Lo/Blomberg,
AA 24: 24-5). In other words, it is "a self-cognition of the understanding
and of reason" (Log, AA 9: 14). What is "the nature of human
understanding" that must be the sole source of this self-cognition? How
are specific logical rules supposed to be derived a priori from it?
To outline an answer to these questions, we may take our first cue from
Kant's remark that logic "does not precede use," which "contains the first
acts [Handlungen] of the understanding," although its rules are still a
priori in that "they contain the ground of all judgments, namely, their
form" (Refl 1602, AA 16: 31-2). To derive logical rules, then, we begin
with an analysis of the nature of the understanding as regards its essential
function or action in abstracto, namely thinking or judging, which is the
act of relating a multitude of given representations in one (Log, AA 9:
101; V-Lo/Politz, AA 24: 577; V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 928; A69/B94).
Such an act necessarily accords with some rules.
Everything in nature ... takes place according to rules, ... The exercise of
our powers [Kriifte] also takes place according to certain rules .... Like all
our powers, the understanding in particular is bound in its actions
[Handlungen] to rules, which we can investigate. (Log 9: 11; see Refl
1579, AA 16: 18; V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 20; V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 311;
V-Lo/Pi:ilitz, AA 24: 502; V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 608; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24:
693; V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 790; V-Lo/Bauch, Pinder 1998: 3-6; V­
Lo/Hechsel, Pinder 1998: 271-72; V-Lo/Warschauer, Pinder 1998: 505)
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Then, assuming that the basic units of representation treated in logic are 
concepts, Kant would at least include the rules pertaining to three kinds of 
representation: concepts, in respect of their capacity to stand in certain 
formal relations with one another (e.g., logical subordination); judgments, 
which represent those relations; inferences, which connect multiple 
judgments.24 This classification correlates with the tripartite composition 
of Part I ("Universal doctrine of elements") of the Logik. (1) "Of 
concepts," which analyzes the "form" of a concept in terms of its capacity 
to represent many things (Log, §5) and specifies a few rules in that 
connection, such as the "universal rules in respect of the subordination of 
concepts" (Log, §14). (2) "Of judgments," which explicates the logical 
forms of judgments as to quantity, quality, relation and modality, forms 
that serve as rules for relating concepts in simple judgments and the latter 
in composite ones (Log, §§20-30). (3) "Of inferences," which identifies all 
the basic patterns of inference - e.g. the four figures of categorical 
syllogisms (Log, §§67-74). Insofar as every possible thought must exhibit 
some form determined by these rules, they constitute (at least part of) the 
necessary conditions of thinking in general.25 
Representations of these rules, as the formal conditions of all possible 
thought, are thus originally acquired a priori in much the same way as 
pure concepts are acquired. In the latter case, reason - once awakened by 
experience - reflects on the ground of the possibility of all experience and 
thereby brings forth representations of pure concepts, for the first time, as 
what constitute that ground from the side of the understanding. Similarly, 
on occasion of the use of the understanding (in thinking), reason reflects 
on the ground of the possibility of all thinking as regards its form and 
thereby deduces a system of logical rules as what make up the ground in 
24 In Kant's logic lectures, concepts are always treated before judgments and 
inferences. The reason may be that the latter cognitions are ultimately composed of 
concepts and, accordingly, one must sort out the relevant formal features of 
concept before explicating the forms of judgment and inference. See V-Lo/Dohna, 
AA 24: 764; V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 274; V-Lo/Busolt, AA 24: 664; V­
Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 928; A130-31/B169. 
25 On Kant's account, the law of contradiction is to be considered only after we
have deduced some of the rules listed here. He understands this law in terms of a 
relation between concepts, roughly as follows: no two contradictory concepts can 
be said of the same thing (A151/Bl90-91; V-Met-L2/Politz, AA 28: 544; V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 789). As such, it determines not the form of cognition, but the 
logical possibility for a compound of several concepts to represent something (V­
Met/Mron, AA 29: 811-12; V-Met-L2/Politz, AA 28: 543; V-MetNigil, AA 29: 
960-61; A291-92/B348) and for a judgment to be true (A75-6/B 100-1; Log, AA 9:
51-3; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 719,921).
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question. In both cases, the acquired representations can be seen as self­
generated on the part of reason, which draws them out of itself a priori, by
inquiring about the rules in accordance with which experience or thinking
ought to take place, i.e., rules that (partly) determine the very possibility of
experience or thinking. 
On this account, the cognition of logical rules boils down to an act of
self-legislation by reason with respect to the necessary laws of thinking:
"[that] reason explicates, according to its own laws, the laws according to
which it ought to think, means that reason provides the rules that it will
discover first of all" (Refl 3939, AA 17: 356; translated in Kant 2013: 43).
These words echo Kant's announcement in the Critique of "the altered
method of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a
priori only what we ourselves have put into them" (Bxviii). As regards the
cognition of logical rules a priori, the alteration of method took place
when Kant moved from what would be a physiological derivation of these
rules to a transcendental one. This transcendental turn has profound
consequences, as we shall see next. 
3.3. We can detect a radical epigenesis of pure reason in Kant's
account of how logical rules can be cognized originally and a priori. With
pure concepts, the epigenesis of pure reason still presupposes some kind of
prefo1mation, in that they must be traced to their first germs and
predispositions, i.e., derived from the inherent laws of human understanding.If these laws include the logical rules mentioned in 3.2, however, they
cannot be traced to yet another set of germs or predispositions. If their
representations emerge through a kind of epigenesis of pure reason, this
epigenesis presupposes no preformation. Pure reason is completely
spontaneous in this case, as it brings forth those representations by nothing
other than an a priori analysis of the essential function of human
understanding, namely thinking. This process has manifested, to borrow
Zammito's terminology again, "the radicality of emergence" (Zammito
2007: 54). 
This involvement of a radical epigenesis of pure reason in the original
cognition of logical rules has at least two significant implications, which
concern the ground of the normativity of logical rules and the boundaries
of their rightful use, respectively. Both implications will remind us of
Kant's emphasis on how his critical method, which focuses on the
quaestio juris about pure cognitions, fundamentally differs from the
physiological method attributed to Locke and Leibniz, which revolved
around the quaestio facti about such cognitions.
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First, Kant's transcendental derivation of logical rules supposedly 
grounds their normative force - or their entitlement as strictly necessary 
laws for thinking in general - in a way that Leibniz's account was unable 
to. To appreciate this point, note that Kant connects original acquisition 
with "natural right" (UE, AA 8: 221; V-Met/Vigil, AA 29: 952).26 He 
distinguishes what one originally acquires from what one originally 
possesses, in that the act of original acquisition alone can establish an 
unconditional right to what is acquired. 
I acquire something when I bring it about (efficio) that it becomes mine. 
Something external is originally mine which is mine without any act that 
establishes a right to it. But that acquisition is original which is not derived 
from what is another's. (MS, 6: 258) 
This contrast between what is given to me from the outside and what I 
have originally acquired helps to illuminate a crucial difference between 
the Leibnizian and Kantian views regarding the source of logical rules 
(insofar as they are represented as the necessary rules of all thinking). On 
Leibniz's account, as we saw in 3.2, if certain rules are deemed necessary 
for all possible use of the human intellect, the primary source of their 
purported authority is the divine intellect. To that extent, the validity of 
logical rules is contingent on something external to us, namely God. For 
Kant, by contrast, the original acquisition of the representations of logical 
rules is also a self-legislative act on the part of pure reason, by which act 
alone can their unconditional authority be secured over all possible use of 
the human understanding and reason. In this way, just as the theory of 
original acquisition established pure concepts of the understanding as valid 
for all possible experience, so has the same theory established logical rules 
as valid for all possible thinking. 
By focusing on the question of right, Kant's account of the source of 
logical cognition also serves to separate the science of logic sharply from 
all other sciences, especially metaphysics, and thereby delineate strict 
boundaries for the rightful use of its rules. In particular, this account 
clarifies that "in logic ... the understanding has to do with nothing further 
than itself and its own form" (Bix) and that, as a result, logic cannot be 
used as a tool or organon for the discovery of material truths - although it 
contains the criteria for assessing the formal correctness of any given 
cognition (A60-2/B84-6; see Log, AA 9: 15; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 694-
26 In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant characterizes "natural right" as the right that
"rests only on a priori principles," in contrast with "positive (statutory) right, which 
proceeds from the will of a legislator" (MS, AA 6: 237). 
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96). In this respect, Kant could stress another substantial difference 
between his account of logical cognition and Leibniz's, a difference that is 
again rooted in a methodological divide. 
Kant attributes to Leibniz the unmatched "extensive skill for 
philosophizing dogmatically," and warns that this way of philosophizing is 
"dangerous because there is much that is false in our dogmatic 
propositions on account of the illusion of experience" (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 
24: 804). This warning, together with a pledge for the critical method of 
philosophizing, is reiterated in the Logik.
As for what concerns the special dogmatic method of philosophizing
peculiar to Leibniz and Wolff, it was quite mistaken. Also, there is so much
in it that is deceptive that it is in fact necessary to suspend the whole
procedure and instead to set in motion another, the method of critical 
philosophizing, which consists in investigating the procedure of reason
itself, in analyzing the whole human faculty of cognition and examining 
how far its limits may go. (Log, AA 9: 32; see V-Lo/Hechsel, Pinder 1998:
301) 
As for what kind of deception might be induced by a dogmatic approach to 
logic, Kant offers some hints in the Critique.
General logic analyzes the entire formal business of the understanding and
reason into its elements, and presents these as principles of all logical
assessment of our cognition . ... nobody can dare to judge of objects and to
assert anything about them merely with logic without having drawn on
antecedently well-founded information about them from outside of logic,
... Nevertheless, there is something so seductive in the possession of an
apparent art [scheinbaren Kunst] for giving all of our cognitions the form
of understanding, even though with regard to their content one may yet be
very empty and poor, that this logic ... has been used as if it were an
organon for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective
assertions, and thus in fact it has hereby been misused. (A60-l/B84-5) 
In brief, the danger of dogmatism in the case of logic is that reason might 
be tempted to misuse it as a tool for acquiring material cognitions. Such 
misuse would resemble the surreptitious move that Kant thinks is involved 
in the illicit use of conceptual analysis to make material or synthetic 
claims. In the latter case, 
[the analysis of given concepts] affords us a multitude of cognitions that ...
are, at least as far as their form is concerned, treasured as if they were new
insights, though they do not extend the concepts that we have in either
matter or content but only set them apart from each other. Now since this
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procedure does yield a real a priori cognition, which makes secure and 
useful progress, reason, without itself noticing it, under these pretenses 
surreptitiously makes [erschleicht] assertions of quite another sort, in 
which it adds something entirely alien to given concepts and indeed does 
so a priori, without one knowing how it was able to do this and without 
such a question even being allowed to come to mind. (A5-6/B9-10) 
Note that in this case reason makes the surreptitious move "without itself 
noticing it" Likewise, reason "can deceive itself unintentionally when it 
oversteps the laws of logic" (V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 695). 
Unsurprisingly, then, Kant gives a similar diagnosis of the root of 
reason's failing and prescribes the same kind of solution in both cases. To 
forestall the misuse of conceptual analysis for expanding material 
cognitions, one must begin by examining the nature and possibility of 
synthetic versus analytic cognitions. (A6/B 10). In the same vein, to 
prevent any unwitting misuse of logic as an organon for the discovery of 
material truths, reason must reflect on its nature and possibility as a 
science, and thereby to clarify the boundaries for the rightful use of its 
rules. In particular, with the notion of logic as cognition of the merely 
formal rules of thinking, one will realize that it is only a "propaedeutic .. . 
to the sciences" and that "when it comes to information [Kenntnissen], .. . 
its acquisition must be sought in the sciences properly and objectively so 
called" (Bix). This reflective awareness of the limits of logic is Kant's 
remedy for the illusion that it might serve as an organon for expanding 
material cognitions: the illusion disappears once those limits have been 
clearly understood. 
Ultimately, as far as Kant is concerned, this clear understanding of the 
limits on the rightful use of logical rules can be accomplished only through 
the move from a metaphysical speculation about their origin to the 
transcendental inquiry about the possibility of cognizing them a priori. 
This inquiry involves a (self-) critique of pure reason, whereby those rules 
are to be derived as the necessary conditions of all possible thinking as 
regards its mere form. By contrast, to approach logic dogmatically is to 
present its rules without a prior investigation of the ground on which 
human reason is able to represent certain rules as essential to all its 
possible use. If Leibniz's metaphysics, which claims God as the sole 
necessary substance and the supreme legislator, allowed him to ground the 
said ability in the divine conception of the universe, by the Kantian 
standard such grounding would be no better than a convenient inquiry 
stopper. 
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4. Conclusion
I have developed an "original acquisition" account of logical cognition 
on Kant's behalf. My main strategy is to see how far some of his 
methodological and philosophical commitments may take him when it 
comes to the question about the source or possibility of the pure cognition 
of logical rules. My analysis revolves around three propositions to which 
Kant seems committed. First, if pure concepts of the understanding arise 
through the epigenesis of pure reason, this epigenesis presupposes some 
kind of preformation: they must be traced to their first germs and 
predispositions in the human intellect - that is, derived from certain 
inherent rules that govern the primary function or action of the human 
understanding and reason, namely thinking. Second, logic is a strictly 
scientific cognition - hence cognition from a completely a priori ground -
of the necessary rules of thinking as regards its form. Third, the absolute 
necessity or validity of pure concepts or logical rules can be established 
only through a true critique of pure reason, which must be sharply 
distinguished from the physiological analysis of the human intellect shared 
by Locke and Leibniz. I have used these propositions to motivate the 
inquiry about the source of logical cognition, frame the success conditions 
of the inquiry, and reveal the originality of the resulting Kantian account 
particularly in terms of the radical epigenesis of pure reason involved in 
the self-legislation of logical rules. 
In a way, my presentation of Kant's non-nativist account of logical 
cognition is programmatic. I have left many points to flesh out. For 
instance, I briefly explained how on Kant's account specific logical rules 
might be derived, completely a priori, from the nature of human 
understanding as its sole source. It will take a separate article to fill in the 
details and show exactly how the derivation goes. It may even prove very 
difficult to obtain a fully satisfactory construction of such a derivation, 
considering that Kant makes no effort to provide an explicit one and that 
we can only figure it out by piecing together scattered fragments from his 
logic corpus.27 In view of this challenge, Kant's explanation of why he left
out the definitions of categories in the Critique may be modified to express 
my intention. 
In a system of pure reason one could rightly demand [a precise derivation 
of logical mies] of me; but here [it] would only distract us from the chief 
point of the investigation by arousing doubts and objections that can well 
27 I start doing so in Lu-Adler 2015, where I also discuss the exegetical challenges 
posed by the various texts that comprise Kant's logic corpus. 
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be refen-ed to another occasion without detracting from our essential aim. 
(A83/B109) 
Part of my aim in introducing Kant's non-nat1v1st account of logical 
cognition may be conveyed in the words Jasche used in his editorial 
introduction to the Logik to characterize Kant's position in the history of 
logic - not as a logician, but as a transcendental philosopher who reflected 
on the foundation of logic. By motivating and outlining Kant's account 
against the backdrop of the Lockean and Leibnizian alternatives, I aimed 
to underscore his status as "the great reformer of philosophy and .. .  of this 
part of theoretical philosophy in particular [i.e. logic]" (Log, AA 9: 5). 
Moreover, by tapping into the historical connections as well as exploring 
the connection between Kant's reflections on the source of pure cognitions 
and on the formation of organic beings, I meant to suggest that it might 
take far more than reading Kant's logic corpus to grasp the deptl1 and 
significance of his philosophical reflections on logic. 28 
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